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@ The EMA "Phoenix": 
soaring on market "hype" 
Like the legendary Phoenix which had burned itself 
to death only to rise from the ashes with the full 
freshness of youth, depressed emerging markets 
often confound investors with an unexpected burst 
into a bull run. The upswing is almost invariably 
triggered by a turnaround in "market hype': Tracing 
the cyclicality of that hype offers great opportunity 
for medium-term investors. 
For foreign investors, the promise and risk of 
emerging markets are both long- and short-term in 
nature. From a long-term perspective, emerging 
markets offer a potential for superior earning growth, 
associated with rapid industrialization, expanding 
domestic markets and changing social and legal 
structures. From a shorter-term standpoint. the 
hallmark of emerging markets is their ongoing 
"discovery". The process begins with figuring out 
which of the "pre-emerging" markets are about to 
emerge and continues until markets have matured. 
However, compared with the information explosion 
in developed economies, emerging market data, 
both at the micro and macro levels, are meager and 
inaccurate. Moreover, given the continuous flux of 
these economies, there is considerable 
disagreement about the risks as well as prospects 
facing their markets. The result is that in the short 
and medium term, emerging markets are destined 
to be affected more by the ups and downs of 
investors' "hype", than by changes in their so- 
called "fair value". 
Value and hype 
Fair value is a long-term concept, involving the use 
of past trends to project a future trajectory. For 
equities, such projection could be derived from two 
basic factors: the long-term earning potential of the 
underlying stocks and a corresponding "normal" rate 
of return (adjusted for risk) to discount this potential 
into its present value. 
Estimated in this way, the market's fair value is a 
slowly changing magnitude. The market's price, on 
the other hand, is much more volatile, oscillating 
sharply above and below its "proper" fair value. The 
difference between the market's price and its fair 
value derives from two principal factors. 
1. Inaccuracies in estimating fair value. The 
determination of fair value depends on one's own 
theoretical framework and subjective hunches about 
the future. Moreover, the necessary data for such 
computations are not freely available in emerging 
markets. This means that fair value is often not an 
objective magnitude, but rather a wide range of 
opinions, so measurement is inherently inaccurate. 
2. Market inefficiencies and investors' 
irrationality. Of course, markets will deviate from 
their fair value even if the latter could be objectively 
and accurately measured, and the divergence could 
persist for a long period of time. One principal 
reason is market inefficiency, which arises when 
investors try to not only to read the market, but also 
'out-guess" what other investors think about it. 
The other, and perhaps more important reason for 
under- and overvaluation is investors' irrationality, 
or "hype". Retail investors often behave as a herd, 
jumping into a rising market near its cyclical peak 
and bailing out just before it has bottomed. The main 
cause is the irrational victory of greed over fear in 
rising markets, and of fear over greed in falling 
markets. Fund managers generally do better 
balancing these twin drives. However, their constant 
attempt to "beat the average" forces them not to 
venture too far from the herd, so their actions often 
reinforce rather than counteract market excesses. 
Although both market inefficiency and investors' 
irrationality cause equity prices to deviate from their 
fair value, the nature of their impact is different. 
While the former is generally irregular and hard to 
predict, the latter tends to be self-relnforclng, 
cycllcal and hence easier to foresee. For this 
reason, a proper reading of market "hype" could 
offer a major opportunity for the alert investor. 
The EMA Phoenix 
Building on these general principles, we have 
developed an alternative asset allocation model for 
emerging markets. Unlike EMA's existing model, 
which is aimed at the long-term investor by picking 
cheap markets with good fundamentals, our new 
Phoenix model -- termed after the legendary sand 
bird -- is directed at medium-term investors, 
selecting markets which are just ready to surge. 
The first step in constructing this model is to 
estimate the fair value of each market, based on 
prevailing earnings per share, long-term projections 
for earning growth and an approximation of the 
currently available "normal" rate of return. The next 
stage is to compute a "Hype Index". This is done by 
taking the ratio between the market's price and its 
fair value and expressing it as a normalized 
deviation from average. 
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The charts on pages 11-12 above contrast for each 
of the 17 countries currently included in our Phoenix 
model, the market's $ total return index against its 
respective "Hype index".' In general, the "Hype 
Index" oscillates within 1.5 to 2 standard deviations 
above and below its mean. Occasionally, much 
larger deviations can be observed. 
Strictly speaking, movements in the "Hype Index" 
are affected by the irrational cyclicality of investors' 
sentiment, as well as by secular inaccuracies in 
measuring fair value and the irregular impact of 
market inefficiencies. All of these effects are evident 
in the charts. Some countries, such as Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico, show very pronounced 
cyclicality. In others, like Argentina, Greece or 
Portugal, the cyclicality is "contaminated" by 
prolonged periods in which the "Hype Index" lies 
above or below its average -- possibly because of 
market inefficiencies or inaccuracies in our 
measurement. 
However, the cyclical nature of investors' "hype" is 
clearly paramount, and as the charts indicate, this 
"hype1' is closely correlated with changes in the 
market's total return index. This correlation becomes 
highly useful when market "hype" reaches extreme 
IOWS. When that happens, the cyclical nature of the 
"Hype Index" means that investors are approaching 
the point in which their greed will finally overcome 
their fear. At this stage, the market's depressed 
sentiment limits the risk of any further downside, 
while providing a large upside potential. When the 
"Hype Index" finally begins to recover, its surge 
could be very rapid, overshadowing any changes in 
fair value and market inefficiency. The net effect is 
usually a large rise in stock prices. 
Picking the right markets 
The Phoenix asset allocation model is based on two 
rules. First, we have chosen "entry" and "exit" 
points. The entry point represents an ultra low 
reading on the "Hype Index". The exit point is a 
slightly higher but still negative value for the index. A 
country becomes a potential buy once its "Hype 
Index" drops below the entry point. When the "Hype 
Index" recovers above this entry point but is still 
below the exit point, the country remains a buy only 
as long as the index continues to trend upward. 
Once the "Hype Index" surpasses the exit point, the 
country is no longer considered a potential buy. The 
idea is to buy when "hype" is very depressed and 
hence highly likely to recover, and sell when the risk 
of reversal is still minimal. 
What makes this strategy work is our ability to 
choose among many markets -- currently 17 and 
hopefully more in the future. Phoenix's second rule 
determines allocation on the basis of "hype": the 
greater the market's pessimism, indicated by the 
negative magnitude of the "Hype Index", the 
greater the share of assets allocated to that country. 
However, not all potential buys need be included. 
When several markets qualify -- but some with a 
"Hype Index" far more depressed than others -- it 
is in fact less risky to concentrate only on the former 
and ignore the latter. This is reflected in our 
allocation algorithm which over-emphasizes the 
weights of markets with a very depressed "Hype 
Index" at the expense of those whose index is only 
"mildly" depressed. The model also provides for "dry 
seasons", without any buy candidates. When no 
country in our universe qualifies, the model's 
recommendation is to stay away from emerging 
markets, parking one's assets in US T-bills. 
Simulation 
Because of data deficiencies, the model begins with 
only part of the countries, adding the rest as the 
necessary data become avai~able.~ 
The table on pages 14-1 5 provides details from a 
simulated Phoenix run. Countries designated as 
"Phoenix best buy" represent potential buys with 
"Hype Indices" fulfilling rule one. For each month, 
these countries are listed from the best to the worst. 
The following column in the table gives the actual 
percent allocations for the month based on rule two, 
and as we explained above, these sometimes do not 
include all potential buys. 
Usually, the Phoenix allocation comprises one or 
two countries. Occasionally, the number rises up to 
four (for instance in August and September 1995), 
or drops to zero when the model recommends to 
stay away from emerging markets altogether (for 
instance, between March and July 1990 and in 
February 1994). 
The model's statistics are charted in the figure on 
page 16 and summarized in the table. 
1 Computations of the latter are based on real-time data. 
For instance, Mexico's "Hype Index" in December 1992 is 
calculated with data available at that time and not 
subsequently. 
- - 
2 1989: Colombia, South Africa; 1990: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Greece, India, Mexico, Portugal, Venezuela; 1992: 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand; 1994: 
Indonesia, Turkey. 
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Phoenix Index at Phoenix podfolio 
Month Phoenix best buy for the month Phoenix allocation for the month end of month turnover 
(decending order) (% share of total portfdio) (Dec 1989.1.00) (% of tofa0 
Jan 1990 Colombia Colombia 100 1.005 100 
Feb 1990 Colombia Colombia 100 1.105 0 
Mar 1990 -- Stay out of emerging markets - US T-bills 1.112 100 
Apr 1990 - Stay out of emerging markets - US T-bills 1.120 0 
May 1990 -Stay out of emerging markets - US T-bills 1.127 0 
Jun 1990 -- Stay out of emerging markets - US T-bills 1.134 0 
Jul1990 - Stay out of emerging markets - US T-bills 1.141 0 
Aug 1990 Portugal, Venezuela Portugal 96.3; Venezuela 3.7 1.074 100 
Sep 1990 Venezuela, Portugal Venezuela 51.6; Portugal 48.4 1.119 47.9 
Oct 1990 Portugal, Venezuela Portuga194.4; Venezuela 5.6 1.165 46 
N w  1990 Venezuela, Brazil, Portugal Venezuela 57.5; Portugal 21.3; Brazil 21.2 1.238 73.1 
Dec 1990 Venezuela, Portugal, Greece Venezuela 60.6; Portugal 39.4 1.359 21.2 
1990 % chg: 359 1990 avg: 40.7 
Jan 1991 Venezuela, Portugal, Brazil Venezuela 100 1.607 39.4 
Feb 1991 Chile, Venezuela, Portugal Chile 68.1; Venezuela 31.9 1.808 68.1 
Mar 1991 Chile, Venezuela, Portugal Chile 100 1.857 31.9 
Apr 1991 Chile, Portugal, Venezuela Chile 100 1.866 0 
May 1991 Chile, Portugal, Venezuela Chile 90; Portugal 10 1.938 10 
Jun 1991 Portugal, Greece Portugal 97.9; Greece 2.1 1.816 90 
Jul1991 Portugal, Greece Portugal 99.9; Greece 0.1 1.960 2 
Aug 1991 Portugal, Greece Portugal 100 1.894 0.1 
Sep 1991 Portugal Portugal 100 1.915 0 
Oct1991 Greece, Portugal Greece99.2: Portugal 0.8 1.937 99.2 
Nov 1991 Greece, Portugal Greece 89.5 Portugal 10.5 1.969 9.7 
Dec 1991 Portugal. Greece Portugal 85.3; Greece 14.7 2.171 74.8 
1991 % chg: 59.7 1991 avg: 314 
Jan 1992 Greece, Portugal ~ ree ie77.1 ;~or tu~a l  22.9 2.3 13 62.4 
Feb 1992 Chile, Portugal, Greece Chile 99.5: Portugal 0.4: Greece 0.1 2.717 99.5 
Mar 1992 Chile, Portugal, Greece Chile 99.8; Portugal 0.1; Greece 0.1 2.974 0.3 
Apr 1992 Chile, Greece, Portugal Chile 100 3.01 1 0.2 
May 1992 Chile, Greece Chile 100 3.037 0 
Jun 1992 Greece, Chile Greece 99.9; Chile 0.1 3.525 99.9 
Jul1992 Greece, Chile Greece 100 3.426 0.1 
Aug 1992 Chile, Greece Greece 100 3.330 0 
Sep 1992 Malaysia, Greece, Chile Malaysia 100 3.543 100 
Oct 1992 Malaysia, Korea, Greece Malaysia 99; Korea 1.0 3.834 1 
Nov 1992 Greece, Taiwan, Korea Greece 100 3.917 100 
Dee 1992 Philipines, Greece, Korea, Taiwan Philipines 65.5; Greece 34.5 3.836 65.5 
1992 % chg: 76.7 1992 avg: 44.1 
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Phoenix Index at Phoenix portfolio 
Month Phoenix best buy for the month Phoenix allocation for the month end of month turnover 
(decending order) (% share of total podtolio) (Dec 1989= 1.00) (Oh of total) 
I 
Jan 1993 Malaysia, Philipines, Greece, Korea Malaysia 99.7; Philipines 0.3 3.714 99.7 
Feb 1993 Malaysia, Greece, Korea Malaysia 100 3.823 0.3 
Mar 1993 Malaysia, Chile, Philipines, Greece Nlalaysia 78.0; Chile 21.8; Philipines 0.2 3.841 22 
Apr 1993 Malaysia, Chile, Philipines, Korea, India, Greece Malaysia 100 4.387 22 
May 1993 India, Korea, Philipines, Greece, Malaysia India 89.8; Korea 10.1; Philipines 0.1 4.654 100 
Jun 1993 Philipines, India, Greece Philipines 99.7; India 0.3 4.566 99.6 
Jul1993 Philipines, India, Greece, Korea Philipines 100 4.990 0.3 
Aug 1993 Philipines, India, Taiwan Greece, Korea Philipines 100 5.035 0 
Sep 1993 Philipines, Taiwan, India, Greece Philipines 100 5.515 0 
Oct 1993 Philipines, Taiwan, India,Greece Philipines 100 6.483 0 
Nov 1993 Philipines, India, Taiwan, Greece Philipines 100 6.793 0 
Dec 1993 India, Greece India 100 7.231 100 
1993 % chg: 88.5 1993 avg: 37.0 
Jan 1994 India, Greece India 100 8.572 0 
Feb 1994 - Stay out of emerging markets -- US T-bills 8.594 100 
Mar 1994 South Africa, Greece South Africa 100 8.364 100 
Apr 1994 Malaysia, Greece Malaysia 100 9.233 100 
May 1994 Malaysia, Greece Malaysia 100 8.871 0 
Jun 1994 Malaysia Malaysia 100 8.963 0 
Jul 1994 Malaysia Malaysia 100 9.251 0 
Aug 1994 Malaysia Malaysia 100 10.246 0 
Sep 1994 Turkey, Malaysia Turkey 100 10.145 100 
Oct 1994 Turkey, Malaysia Turkey 100 10.019 0 
Nov 1994 Turkey, Malaysia Turkey 100 1 1.530 0 
Dec 1994 Malaysia, Indonesia Malaysia 100 1 1.088 100 
1994 % chg: 53.3 1994 avg: 41.7 
Jan 1995 Malaysia, Indonesia Malaysia 100 9.847 0 
Feb 1995 Malaysia, Mexico, Indonesia Malaysia 100 1 1.230 0 
Mar 1995 Mexico, Malaysia Mexico 99.8; Malaysia 0.2 1 1.490 99.8 
Apr 1995 Mexico, Indonesia, Malaysia,Thailand Mexico 100 13.944 0.2 
May 1995 Mexico, Malaysia,Thailand, Indonesia Mexico 100 13.255 0 
Jun 1995 Mexico, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia Mexico 100 14.603 0 
Jul1995 Mexico, Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, India Mexico 99.9; Thailand 0.1 16.243 0.1 
Aug 1995 Mexico; Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia Mexico 82.8; Taiwan 15.4; Thailand 1.5; Malaysia 0.4 16.371 17.1 
Sep 1995 Taiwan, Malaysia, Mexico,Thailand, Turkey Taiwan 68.8; Malaysia 30.8; Mexico 0.2; Thailand 0.2 yM % chg: 47.6 83.9 
ytd avg: 22.3 
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The overall record is rather impressive: 
From its starting date in December 31, 1989, the 
Phoenix has recorded a 63.7% compounded rate 
of return. This compares with 12.3% for the IFC 
emerging markets investable index, yielding an 
average annual premium of 45.8%. 
Over this period, the model never looses money 
on an annual basis, and with the exception of two 
months (January-February 1992), always beats the 
IFC benchmark by a wide margin. (The inferior 
results for January 1992 occurred when Phoenix's 
annual return was 43.9%.) 
Despite the narrow emphasis on one to four 
markets at any one time, the risk of short-term 
losses is actually very small: the Phoenix 
experiences only four monthly declines in excess of 
4%, compared with nine for the IFC index. Also, the 
Phoenix index did not drop for more than two 
months in a row, whereas the IFC index 
experienced up to six months of straight monthly 
declines . 
Because of its rapid turnover, the Phoenix carries 
higher transaction costs than those generated by 
long-term investment strategies. However, 
compared with the model's returns, these 
transaction costs are in fact rather low. The last 
column in the table on pages 14-15 suggests an 
average monthly turnover of only 37.5%, which 
should limit monthly transaction cost to a ceiling of 
1.5% for retail investors and far lower for fund 
managers. 
Strategy 
The promise of Phoenix's contrarian strategy is well 
illustrated by its allocations since early 1995. 
Emerging markets entered a period of gloom in the 
wake of the Mexico crisis and many began talking 
about "submerging markets". It is exactly this kind of 
negative, and largely irrational sentiment which 
makes the Phoenix work. Emerging markets will 
undoubtedly face serious hurdles in the future, but 
the prospects for such difficulties have not been 
materially altered by the Mexican crisis as such. 
Investors, however, have over-reacted, letting their 
fears far outweigh their greed. By February Ist, the 
Phoenix already identified Mexico as a potential buy, 
but since Malaysian "hype" was even more 
depressed, kept Mexico out of its allocation. By 
March Ist, however, Mexico accounted for 
practically 100% of the model allocation, and the 
investment paid handsomely -- some 44.6% over 
the next five months. In August, Mexico's share 
dropped to 83%, yielding to better potential in 
Taiwan, and in September this was finally reduced 
to nil. As of September Ist, the Phoenix allocation 
was split between Taiwan (69%) and Malaysia 
(31 %). 
The Phoenix model is currently in its experimental 
stage. Over the next few months,. we plan to add it 
as an additional service to our subscribers. bl 
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